Jarallah’s death follows a recent visit to the United States by Vice President Tareq al-Hashimi to discuss some 500 banned candidates in the Iraqi election, according to an article in the Daily Star. A recent reinstatement of many of the banned candidates appears to have been generally supported by the Obama administration. The reinstatement was contested by some members of the government who stood to benefit, but al-Hashimi has urged those in opposition to the appeal committee’s edict, to accept their decision and allow the elections to proceed as scheduled.

In light of some publicly voiced misconceptions regarding the Army’s capacity to deploy additional soldiers to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), RAND Arroyo Center was asked to assess the demands placed upon the Army by these deployments. Analyzing Department of Defense deployment data, Arroyo found that the Army has provided over 1 million troop-years to OIF and OEF, and that most active-duty soldiers now deployed to these operations are on their second or third tour. Those active-duty soldiers who have not yet gone to Iraq or Afghanistan typically fall into one of two categories: new soldiers, needing to complete training before deployment; and experienced soldiers, needed for other missions. The demand for active duty soldiers in OEF and OIF would have exceeded supply under the Army’s normal deployment policies, so the Army and the Department of Defense took several actions to increase supply: it increased the overall size of the active component; it reassigned soldiers from other assignments and missions to the pool of soldiers rotating to OEF and OIF; and it greatly increased the rate at which soldiers rotate to and from the wars. Despite these adaptations, the Army retains very limited unutilized capacity to deploy additional active-duty soldiers beyond the current troop levels in OEF and OIF.

U.S. withdrawal from Iraq could affect Iraq’s internal security and stability, which could in turn affect U.S. strategic interests and the safety of U.S. troops and civilians in Iraq. U.S. policy-makers need a dynamic analytic framework with which to examine the shifting motivations and capabilities of the actors that affect Iraq’s security. The framework recognizes dangers from extremists, mainstream political actors, and the politicization of the security forces. It asserts that security in Iraq depends on the major political actors using the political process instead of violence to achieve their goals, and professional, apolitical security forces. Extremist violence, while inevitable, cannot by itself threaten the state. To help achieve U.S. goals in Iraq, long-term U.S.-Iraq military cooperation should have three missions: building security force capability, enhancing its professional character, and building confidence between Iraqi state and Kurdish regional forces. Fulfilling these three missions will require well-prepared and well-placed, relatively senior professionals at every level; development of long-term relationships with Iraqi counterparts; and, possibly, a newly agreed mandate. With such efforts, the United States should be able to contribute to continued strengthening of the internal security and stability of Iraq even as it withdraws its forces.

Across predominantly Muslim nations, there is little enthusiasm for the extremist Islamic organizations Hamas and Hezbollah, although there are pockets of support for both groups, especially in the Middle East.

Four years after its victory in Palestinian parliamentary elections, Hamas receives relatively positive ratings in Jordan (56% favorable) and Egypt (52%). However, Palestinians are more likely to give the group a negative (52%) than a positive (44%) rating. And reservations about Hamas are particularly common in the portion of the Palestinian territories it controls — just 37% in Gaza express a favorable opinion, compared with 47% in the West Bank.